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Abstract
Critics have assailed objectivity as a guiding principle of journalists for more than half a
century, dismissing its practices as defensive routines or strategic rituals. This study compares
transparency, often touted as a new ethical framework for news media, and substantial
completeness, a truth-telling strategy that has received less attention, to gauge whether
substantial completeness could more adequately replace objectivity as journalism’s core
principle. A survey emailed to journalists nationwide drew 70 responses and confirmed the
hypothesis that a majority of American newspaper and newspaper website journalists view
substantial completeness as an ethical obligation when it is described as a reversible interaction,
meaning that reporting contains all the information the journalist would want for decisionmaking as a reader. The survey also operationalized research questions comparing completeness
and two forms of transparency as priorities and asking if time and space constraints make
completeness impossible.
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Introduction
Since the turn of the millennium, transparency has been posited by media influencers, from
blogging gurus to journalism scholars, as a new ethic for mass media. Meanwhile, substantial
completeness, a truth-telling strategy that could more adequately replace objectivity as
journalism’s core principle, languished in the inner pages of journalism textbooks (in particular
Klaidman & Beachamp, 1987) and received somewhat more attention in public relations. In
discussions of journalistic truthfulness, mentions of completeness have tended to be dismissive,
noting the impossibility of telling the whole truth or pointing out the time constraints inherent in
reporting. But philosopher Sissela Bok’s (1978/1999) disentanglement of the possibility of
truthfulness from the impossibility of knowing the whole truth was core to David Martinson’s
(1996) proposal of a guideline of substantial completeness with reversibility—essentially the
Golden Rule method of imagining oneself on the receiving end of one’s actions—for public
relations practitioners. This study explores the possibility that journalists would adopt a version
of Martinson’s principle, namely that communicators should provide information as complete as
they would want for their own decision-making.
Much of the work on transparency itself has been conceptual (e.g., Plaisance, 2007;
Allen, 2008), focusing on what transparency is in principle; or prescriptive (e.g., Kovach &
Rosenstiel, 2001; Blood, 2002), asserting rules or routines that supposedly constitute
transparency in practice. In more recent years, applied research has been done that begins to link
how journalists think or feel about transparency as a truth strategy and whether they believe in or
apply some of the associated practices, especially in comparison to objectivity (Hellmueller,
Vos, & Poepsel, 2013). Another informative line of research—of which this researcher
discovered no existing examples—would examine the interplay of all three concepts. Several
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scholars have asserted or repeated that “transparency trumps objectivity” (Hellmueller, et al.,
2013, p. 288, quoting Singer, 2010, p. 122, who cited Karlsson, 2008, where this can be inferred
but is not stated). This suggests questions of whether transparency also trumps completeness, or
whether the reverse is true, or if, perhaps, journalists might see a completeness principle as
encompassing the requirements of transparency.
The current study explores a few such questions. A survey of U.S. newspaper and
newspaper website journalists is used to gauge the relative status they assign completeness and
transparency as ethical requirements for their work. Other scholars have parsed transparency
into disclosure and participatory forms (Karlsson, 2010; Hellmueller et al., 2013). Leaving aside
participatory practices, this study checks whether journalists consider certain kinds of disclosure
to be actual ethical obligations. Covering less often explored ground, the researcher also sought
to determine whether journalists believe substantial completeness—defined as providing as
complete a version of events to readers as the journalists would wish to have for themselves—to
be an ethical concern. Indeed, this point supplied the study its central hypothesis, now
confirmed. Further, journalists were asked whether disclosure transparency—revealing how
stories are obtained and facts about the journalists themselves—obviates any obligation for
substantial completeness, and vice versa. Finally, surveyed journalists answered whether time
and space constraints render an ethic of substantial completeness impracticable in their work.
As background, the literature review explores transparency and then substantial
completeness in detail. The idea here is not to assert that transparency and completeness are
mutually exclusive, but to determine which could best serve as a compelling, overarching
principle for journalistic action. Objectivity is explored in a more limited way, in relation to the
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criticisms that have been leveled at it and what these say about the possibility of and need for
positive reasons for decision-making about news content.
Literature Review
Reasons for action
Criticisms of journalistic practice and the principles that guide it are seldom if ever
directed against the idea that reporting should be thorough, but often imply or identify
shortcomings in completeness or depth. Nick Davies (2009) excoriated the British press for a
practice he and others labeled “churnalism” (p. 59 and throughout) in which journalists churned
out stories by repackaging press releases and wire stories and had no time to check facts or
interview more than the most easily accessible sources. This bears certain resemblances to Doug
Underwood’s revelations in When MBA’s Rule the Newsroom (1993) that a business-dominated
stance in American newspapers resulted in “cutbacks in coverage, softening of news content,
loss of depth” (p. 119). In a close reading of criticism of news media by bloggers during a single
month in 2009, Vos, Craft and Ashley (2011) found that “much of the media criticism …
focused on the perceived bias or the lack of impartiality and objectivity of traditional news
media” (p. 857).
But the objectivity principle itself has been under fire for decades, and much of the
criticism has also been directed at the idea that objectivity, as understood and practiced, has
served as an excuse for sloppy and incomplete reporting. Looking back to the 1890s for the
coming of age of American “objective” journalism, David Mindich (1998) focused on the failure
of the Associated Press and self-consciously objective newspapers, in particular the New York
Times, to expose the reality behind widespread lynching of African Americans in the South. In
3

his view, “objectivity” (used in quotation marks throughout Mindich’s book) provided an excuse
to report the facts of these murders in a superficially balanced style, failing to express outrage
and reflecting journalists’ own racism. When Brent Cunningham (2003) wrote a Columbia
Journalism Review cover story calling for a rethinking of objectivity in the first years of the 21st
century, he observed that “if space is a problem, time is an even greater one” and argued that
“this lack of time makes a simpleminded and lazy version of objectivity all the more tempting”
(p.27). The mechanism of his argument was that objectivity, understood in the sense of
detachment and avoidance of bias, has been used to excuse an attitude in which reporters serve
as passive conduits for official information, as in the build-up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq. However, Cunningham (2003) did not reject objectivity, but argued for a reformed
understanding of it, in which journalists acknowledge a degree of subjectivity and recommit to
the active pursuit of news, developing expertise to sort through competing claims and provide
explanations.
Another tactic of objectivity critics has been to expose exterior causes or ulterior motives
for the adoption of supposedly lofty journalistic principles. Examining Adolph Ochs’ role in
developing the New York Times to national stature beginning with his purchase of the paper in
1896, Andrew Porwancher (2011) argued “that objectivity was a contemporaneous legitimation
of journalistic practices, a set of ideal interests used to camouflage or even further the press’
material interests: increased profit, advertising, and circulation as well as protection from legal
sanctions” (p. 186). The posture reflected in Ochs’ famous declaration for reporting “the news
impartially, without fear or favor, regardless of party, sect or interest involved” (Ochs, 1896, as
quoted in Porwancher, 2011, p. 191) helped secure a broad readership while the Times, in
Porwancher’s analysis, favored pro-business interests and made selective use of objective

4

reporting. Pamela Shoemaker and Stephen Reese (1996) labeled practices associated with
objectivity as defensive routines. In addition, these authors observed that the routines were not
so much believed in by individuals as required by organizations:
In this sense, objectivity is less a core belief of journalists than a set of procedures
to which journalists willingly conform in order to protect themselves from attack.
Their editors and publishers are equally concerned with jeopardizing their own
positions. (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 112)
Shoemaker and Reese cited sociologist Gaye Tuchman, who more than 20 years earlier
had assailed practices then associated with objectivity as “strategic rituals” (Tuchman,
1972, p. 678), which served to defend journalists from criticism.
Amid assertions that transparency was becoming an ascendant new ethic for
journalists, early 21st century scholarship nevertheless portrayed it sometimes in the
same terms of prudential self-protection and excuse-making that generations of critics
have applied to the objectivity standard. Observing the tendency of bloggers to rely on
news media sources but then bite the hand that feeds them, Singer (2007) stated that
“journalists today can expect that anything they write or say will be scrutinized by
someone able and more than willing to instantly publish the outcome of that scrutiny” (p.
89). Allen (2008) described the ethic of transparency as easy to understand in terms of
the media facing increased examination and criticism of their daily product. Karlsson
(2010) explicitly echoed Tuchman by labeling the new practices “rituals of transparency”
(Karlsson, 2010, phrase used in article title and explained p. 536).
This researcher’s point is not to dismiss transparency as a mere assemblage of
rituals or routines, but on the contrary to observe that a profession which continues to see
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its central principles in terms of defensiveness, ritual and excuse is unlikely to make
much of them as reasons for action. A philosophy of action, particularly where it
distinguishes internal reasons from external causes, can provide a means of raking away
the wreckage left by decades of attacks on the practices and principle of objectivity. In
the philosophical tradition, a distinction between a person’s internal reasons and what are
now generally called causes dates back to Aristotle, who identified four different types of
“cause” (Causes, 1979). Among these, only the efficient cause corresponds to what in
English is now termed a cause in the cause-and-effect sense. What we now call reasons
are more closely aligned to what for Aristotle were final causes, including but not limited
to conscious intentions (Causes, 1979). In the early to mid-20th century, Ludwig
Wittgenstein brought new life to the distinction between final and efficient causes by
asserting that people know their reasons for their actions with certainty but can only
hypothesize about the causes (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003). As one interpreter put
it, “Agents have first-person authority about their reasons for their actions: What they
sincerely claim to be their reason is what we call their reason” (Schroeder, 2010, p. 557).
Therefore, professional principles, when sincerely set forth as reasons for action, become
such, even when sociological, financial or legal factors make these reasons particularly
convenient. Ochs’ profit motive and acknowledged “devotion to the cause of sound
money and tariff reform” (Ochs, 1896, as quoted in Porwancher, 2011, p. 192) did not
rule out sincerity about impartial reporting.
Donald Davidson (1963/1980), agreeing with Wittgenstein to some extent,
differed with him in a way that has defined much of the more recent debate in the
philosophy of action. In contrast to Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003), who
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separated logical explanations from causal ones (p. 109), Davidson (1963/1980)
maintained that reasons, or at least a kind called primary reasons, are, after all, causes for
actions. For Davidson, a primary reason required two elements, first a desire, or “pro
attitude toward actions of a certain kind” (p. 3), and second, a belief about how to realize
that action. In Davidson’s examples, a pro attitude can be momentary, such as wanting
to turn on a light, and a belief quite trivial, e.g., believing that flipping a switch will make
this happen. But pro attitudes also include “moral views, aesthetic principles, economic
prejudices, social conventions” (Davidson, 1963/1980, p. 4). While this does nothing in
itself to sort out moral reasons from petty ones, and Davidson wished to re-identify
rationalization as “a species of causal explanation” (p. 3), pro attitudes remained for him
internal. “The relation between desire and action is not simply empirical; there are other,
equally essential criteria for desires—their expression in feelings and in actions they do
not rationalize, for example” (Davidson, 1963/1980, p. 15). For Wittgenstein, the
essential point had been to distinguish reasons, as the essence of rationalization, from
external causes he regarded as hypothetical. “The cause of an action is established
hypothetically, i.e., such that further experience can confirm or contradict it. The reason
is what has been specified as such” (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003, p. 107, italics in
original). In another passage, Wittgenstein reportedly1 discerned motives as a species of
reasons, stating, “The word motive we reserve for cases in which there is significance for
human life,” (p. 429) and citing ethics and jurisprudence as realms where it is used. Both
Davidson (1963/1980) and Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003)

1

The Wittgenstein citations are all from a work attributed to both Wittgenstein and Waismann, from notes
Waismann took during interviews with Wittgenstein in the 1930s. There has been some debate over whether the
remarks are completely Wittgenstein’s, or to some extent Waismann’s (Wittgenstein & Waismann, 2003, Preface).
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acknowledged the possibility of someone lying about their reasons, but neither made any
provision for hypothetical causes, asserted by other persons, to trump honest reasons.
Journalists, then, can assert ethical principles as pro attitudes or motives and prove their
reasons by their actions.
Transparency
A peculiar thing about deeply theorized principles of journalism is that they often appear
first in everyday practice and common-sense instruction. Probably the most commonly cited
source for a transparency standard in journalism—appearing in the reference lists of at least
seven other works that are in turn cited in this literature review—is a journalism handbook and
its revision, Kovach and Rosenstiel’s The Elements of Journalism (2001; 2007). Citing no
philosophical theories,2 case studies or surveys, Kovach and Rosenstiel simply prescribed a
“Rule of Transparency” that “involves the journalist asking for each event, ‘What does my
audience need to know to evaluate this information for itself? And is there anything in our
treatment of it that requires explanation?’” (2001, p. 81).
Whether Kovach and Rosenstiel’s 2001 rule was really a precursor to, let alone a
conscious influence on, many of the practices that have since been associated with transparency
is debatable. They did weigh in on the further development of the idea with the revised version
of their handbook (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007), rechristening their rule the “Spirit of
Transparency” and adding a third element to the previous two questions: “Journalists should
acknowledge the questions their stories are not answering,” (p. 95). But by then, transparency
had gained popularity as an ethic of the blogosphere. Lasica (2003; 2004) and Singer (2007)

2

Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001, 2007) did cite Walter Lippmann, as will be discussed later. He is usually considered
a journalist and political commentator, not a philosopher, although he did write a book called The Public
Philosophy.
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observed the development of transparency as the central norm of blogging and suggested that
journalism and blogging needed each other’s influence. Singer cited The Weblog Handbook
(Blood, 2002) as especially influential in setting forth ethical guidelines incorporating
transparency.
In a set of six rules, “each” of which was intended “to bring transparency … into every
aspect of weblogging” (p. 116), Blood’s handbook (2002) advised bloggers to 1. publish as fact
only what they believe true; 2. provide links to all referenced online materials; 3. make public
corrections for information found to be false, including notes about previously published
inaccuracies plus links to more accurate info; 4. add to, but not rewrite or delete, entries, thus
treating every entry as permanent; 5. disclose conflicts of interest; and 6. provide notes on the
nature of questionable sources (pp. 117-121, paraphrased). By implication, her first rule would
bring general truthfulness under the rubric of transparency, much as objectivity was viewed by
some journalists in the past as an all-encompassing ethic (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Mills,
1983; Merrill, 1985). But the rest of Blood’s list identifies several of the practices commonly
associated with transparent journalism3 as practiced online, especially in regard to disclosure
transparency.
A distinction between disclosure transparency and participatory transparency has been
advanced by some authors (Karlsson, 2010; Hellmueller et al., 2013). Commonly reported
practices of disclosure transparency include publishing links to original material and sources,
acknowledging errors while publishing corrections alongside the original information, and
“communicating the preferences and motifs of the media worker” (Karlsson, 2010, p. 537,

3

However, Blood (2003), in an article published the year after her handbook, asserted that blogging is not a new
form of journalism and “deliberately reject[ed] the journalistic standards of fairness and accuracy in favor of
transparency as the touchstone for ethical blogging” (final para.). She did not suggest that the practices she
recommended for bloggers should replace fairness and accuracy as standards for journalists.
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referencing Hayes, Singer & Ceppos, 2007). The practices, or “rituals,” of participatory
transparency are “ways in which people both inside and external to journalism are given a
chance to monitor, check, criticize and even intervene in the journalistic process,” (Karlsson
2010, p. 538, quoting Deuze, 2005, p. 455). Deuze, however, had not made an explicit
distinction between participatory and disclosure forms of transparency. Instead, Deuze (2005)
wrote that concerns about control and transparency were intertwined in the changing media
landscape and that “more shared control over newsgathering and storytelling increases
opportunities for surveillance and processual criticism” (p.255). As examples of participatory
transparency, Karlsson (2008) mentioned public discussions of publication decisions and
revisions of subsequent drafts after input from users.
Some practices associated with transparency are roughly as new as the 21st century, even
in their application to older media such as newspapers and broadcasting. Others are matters of
emphasis. The strategy of having reporters and editors disclose their preferences, which may
include political affiliations among other things, is a clear departure from the earlier “objective”
practice, which stressed detachment and nonpartisanship (Mindich, 2001). The insistence on
retaining erroneous versions is less of a break from the past, considering that earlier editions of
newspapers lingered in morgues, libraries, and clip files. It reflected a concern, at the beginning
of the millennium, that the digital environment provided the opportunity to “simply wipe [errors]
out and set the record straight by immediately publishing a new version of a story” (Arant &
Anderson, 2001, p. 58), which has also been a concern for bloggers, as seen in Blood’s (2002)
third and fourth rules. However, the potential to update stories without acknowledging earlier
errors had always existed, and radio and television, especially before home recording devices
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became common, had greater potential for letting mistakes vanish into thin air than the Internet
does.
Because cache functions and user downloads give earlier versions of Internet stories
considerable durability, one motivation for the drive to transparency may have been an
increased, rather than decreased, likelihood of being caught in errors or attempts to expunge
them. Observing the tendency of bloggers to rely on news media sources but bite the hand that
feeds them, Singer (2007) stated that “journalists today can expect that anything they write or say
will be scrutinized by someone able and more than willing to instantly publish the outcome of
that scrutiny” (p. 89), and Allen (2008) described the ethic of transparency as easy to understand
in terms of the media facing increased examination and criticism of their daily product. So, the
emphasis on transparency may not stem so directly from the Internet’s creation of some new
ethical understanding as from the need for altered defensive behaviors to fit a new environment.
Again, all of this discussion of defensive strategies echoes Tuchman’s (1972) assault on thencurrent practices as “rituals of objectivity” that served to protect journalists from criticism, as
Karlsson (2010) made explicit when he labeled the newer practices “rituals of transparency.”
More positively, the move to greater transparency in journalism has been described as
central to a shift from “gatekeeper ethics” to “relationship ethics” (Singer, 2010). Singer framed
her version of the “transparency trumps objectivity” declaration as an important message
bloggers had for journalists: “In a network, ‘transparency trumps objectivity.’ It becomes
necessary to show what goes into the process of making news—and of making decisions about
news” (Singer, 2010, p. 122). But she also observed that the shift had more to do with the
reasoning seen as supporting ethical guidelines than with the specific guidelines themselves:
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“When journalists move to a network, the ethical principles remain essentially the same, but the
rationale for them changes to one based on relationships” (p.119).
Not surprisingly, as both are truth-telling strategies, objectivity and transparency can be
seen as closely related. Seeking to help establish a “new journalism of verification,” Kovach and
Rosenstiel (2001; 2007) invoked Walter Lippman’s 1920s efforts to place journalism on a more
scientific basis. Lippmann (1920/2010) put this in terms of objectivity and of judging and
revealing the reliability of sources, not transparency. But Kovach and Rosenstiel made the
overlap explicit in their section titled “Transparency”:
In journalism, only by explaining how we know what we know can we approximate this
idea of people being able, if they were of a mind to, to replicate the reporting. This is
what is meant by objectivity of method in science, or in journalism. (2001, p. 81; 2007, p.
96)
Notably, their version of transparency emphasizes naming sources and admitting limitations,
rather than audience participation or Internet-specific techniques.
Some authors have sought a theoretical basis in the writings of Immanuel Kant and
Jurgen Habermas for journalistic transparency as an ethical concern. In this regard, Plaisance
(2007) argued that the universal reach of Kant’s categorical imperative, “Act in accordance with
a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have” (Kant 1797/1991, p. 395 as
quoted in Plaisance, 2007, p. 190) has been overemphasized. Instead, Plaisance pointed to
Kant’s principle of humanity—namely that people should be treated never merely as means but
always as ends in themselves—as the basis both for the categorical imperative and Kant’s
emphasis on telling the truth in all circumstances. Kant’s principle means treating every person
as a free moral agent, and transparency is essential for moral agency because it is the basis of
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trust. In other words, “society would not be possible if we did not place a premium on the spirit
of openness, or transparent behavior” (Plaisance, 2007, p. 191). However, Plaisance qualified his
Kantianism by observing that “insisting on transparency unmediated by other values can
certainly become destructive and self-defeating” (p. 192).
Allen (2008) found the Kantian basis alone inadequate because “journalism ethics is not
simply about individual action” (p.329) and looked instead to political theory. In particular, he
cited Habermas’s discourse ethics, and the transparency apparent in an assertion that practical
discourse would be rendered meaningless unless the participants brought with them “their
individual life-histories, their identities, their needs and wants, their traditions, membership and
so forth” (Habermas, 1982, p. 255, italics in original; also quoted by Allen, 2008, p. 331).
Habermas was actually responding to a specific critic who raised doubts about “the abstract
universality of a discourse ethic” (Habermas, 1982, p. 254). If accepted, that universality
apparently would extend the ethic to journalists, requiring them to reveal much about themselves
as “real life” participants in real communication. His concern for the universalizability of his
ethics also keeps Habermas in the Kantian tradition, making Allen’s point one about the
evolution or refinement of the tradition rather than a contradiction of it.
However, Allen also turned to Michel Foucault as a history-conscious thinker with
doubts about transparency, and interpreted him as warning that “too much transparency serves
only to tie citizens ever closer to disciplines and limits the ability of individuals to become what
they want to become” (Allen, 2008, p. 334). At once a theorist and a critic of transparency,
Allen suggested that revealing too much about how journalism is done might hinder journalists’
attempts to increase legitimacy and trust with the public. Of course, the ramifications depend on
what, and how much, is disclosed. Undesirable effects of having reporters who cover politics or
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government reveal how they voted in recent elections are easy to imagine, both in terms of
cooperation from sources and credibility with audiences. Other scholars (e.g., Phillips, 2010)
who see benefits to increased transparency also say there must be limitations, such as respecting
journalists’ obligation not to reveal confidential sources.
Articles about news organizations’ actual adoption of transparency described or
suggested a variety of different practices. Providing insight into how news is gathered is one
theme, as when a television show and a website gave audiences a behind-the-scenes look at
investigative reporting (Schapiro, 2008). Attribution of story sources was counted a
transparency issue by a researcher who reported that British newspapers commonly printed press
releases and stories taken from other papers without attribution (Phillips, 2010). Another author
reported the reluctance of American news organizations to reveal reporters’ political leanings
and suggested that disclosure could justify loosening newspapers’ bans on reporters becoming
active in political and social organizations (Richardson, 2009). Lasica (2003) mentioned
practices that include journalists “exposing the raw material of their stories-in-progress, asking
readers for expert input, posting complete text of interviews alongside the published story, and
writing follow-up stories based on outsiders’ tips.” (“Transparency of Reporting,” para. 2).
In a content analysis of 335 news items during one week from three major newspapers’
websites—one each in the United States, the United Kingdom and Sweden—Karlsson (2010)
quantified 10 participatory transparency features: publishing journalists’ email addresses with
news stories; using comment threads, discussion, blog links, chat, polls, and reader news;
seeking reader collaboration, publishing reader contributions, and allowing readers to report
errors. He also considered four disclosure transparency features: use of detailed time stamps,
highlighting and explanation of corrections, use of external links, and publication of original
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documents. Termed a pilot study, it reached a “somewhat divided conclusion” (Karlsson, 2010,
p. 542) about the adoption of transparency practices at the various sites and made no comparison
to objectivity practices. Nor could a content analysis alone uncover journalists’ motivations
behind their practices, whether ethical, prudential, or merely habitual.
Explicitly contrasting their work to Karlsson’s (2010) study, which had looked for a shift
in journalistic practices, Hellmueller, Vos, and Poepsel (2013) surveyed 228 U.S. newspaper
journalists “about their procedural norms” (p. 289). More to the point, several key questions
were aimed at whether journalists believe in procedures that the researchers had associated with
transparency and objectivity. This focus on journalists’ beliefs about the rightness of certain
approaches, combined with the inclusion of both transparency and objectivity, made the
Hellmueller et al. study the most relevant precursor to the current study of any discovered. The
researchers framed their work as an attempt to detect an incipient paradigm shift in journalistic
“cultural capital” (Hellmueller et al, 2013, p. 290) from norms of objectivity to those of
transparency. Whether that is what they actually measured depends on acceptance of the beliefs
and procedures they associated with transparency and objectivity as actually constituting those
norms. Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with assertions on a five-point Likerttype scale. For the disclosure dimension of transparency Hellmueller et al. posed these
statements: “I believe in telling everyone who comes across my work where my facts originated”
and “… it is essential to show anyone who comes across my work that I include all concerned
parties in my news stories.” For the participatory dimension, the questions were whether
journalists believed it “important to allow readers to contribute to news content” and “acceptable
to include user-generated information in [their] work” (p. 294). To measure what researchers
called the factualness dimension of objectivity, they used statements about journalists’ belief in
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“writing stories around verifiable facts” and whether “as long as I don’t willfully suppress
relevant information I will write truthful stories” (Hellmueller et al., 2013, p. 294). To measure
a neutrality dimension of objectivity they used the statements “I believe it is not acceptable for
my reporting to cause readers to feel one way or another” and “… the way I write stories should
not nudge readers to take a particular side of a debate or issue” (p. 295).
From a historical perspective, a better grounded approach to neutrality would have been
to ask journalists whether they believe they should keep their own opinions out of their reporting
and whether they take care not to let those opinions determine which facts they include.
Neutrality of this type has long been seen as a central concept of objectivity, both within
journalism (Streckfuss, 1990; Wien, 2005), and outside it, particularly in the sciences (Daston &
Galison, 2007; Gaukroger, 2012). Yet Hellmueller et al. (2013) did not report asking any
questions about how journalists approach their work in relation to their own opinions. Those
unasked questions could have fathomed the neutrality dimension without the implication,
inherent in Hellmueller et al.’s (2013) two neutrality questions, that an objective report must not
cause readers to form opinions or even have feelings about the news. This implication clashes
with the researchers’ observations that weight-of-evidence reporting can be associated as easily
with objectivity as with transparency (p. 291) and that conclusions can also be drawn from
balanced reporting. Noting that the association of objectivity with balanced reporting remains
open to debate, the team led by Hellmueller poised balanced reporting, or “giving at least two
sides to every story and letting persons draw their own conclusions” (p. 295, Table 2, italics
added here) as a cross-tabulated question across the four dimensions of objectivity and
transparency. However, they made including “all concerned parties in … news stories” (p. 294)
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a definitive element of transparency—without explaining how this differs in substance from
balanced reporting.
Hellmueller et al. (2013) also related these dimensions to respondents’ length of
professional experience, their gender, whether they consider themselves to be “net natives,” and
separately, to questions designed to measure their “online socialization.” Like their matrix of
questions, the Hellmueller-led researchers’ findings were complex, and will not be discussed
further here. But the 2013 study did demonstrate that a survey could compare journalists’ beliefs
about objectivity and transparency as competing norms. Furthermore, Hellmueller et al.’s
question about avoiding the suppression of relevant information, although used as a measure of
objectivity, lets an elephant called completeness into the room.
Substantial completeness
The concept of substantial completeness, or more specifically substantial completeness
with reversibility, has received some attention in public relations, but has roots in journalistic
ethics and broader discussions of truthfulness. David Martinson (1996-97) combined the
concepts of substantial completeness and reversibility as a prescribed norm for public relations
practitioners. This juxtaposition transforms the principle of completeness into a strategy for
truthfulness in professional communications generally, with the implication that the reversibility
aspect should also be useful in journalism.
However, a brief history of the substantial completeness idea flows better,
chronologically and conceptually, from a starting point in the work of philosopher Sissela Bok.
In her widely influential book on lying, Bok (1978/1999) differentiated truth, in the
epistemological sense of what can be known as true, from truthfulness in the ethical sense.
Truthfulness involves intention. Confusion of the truth and truthfulness, coupled with assertions
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that “the whole truth” is unknowable, have served as a pretext for shortchanging the issue of
truthfulness in codes of ethics and in professional practices, argued Bok. “The fact that the
‘whole truth’ can never be reached in its entirety should not, therefore, be a stumbling block in
the much more limited inquiry into questions of truth-telling and falsehood” (Bok, 1978/1999, p.
13). The conception of truthfulness as a matter of intent leads to the realization that its opposite,
deception, takes other forms besides direct lying, including misdirection and withholding
information.
Just as knowing the whole truth may well be impossible in an epistemological sense,
telling the whole truth of an event or issue, in all its details, is impossible for media organizations
with limited time and space. Acknowledging this, Stephen Klaidman and Tom L. Beauchamp
(1987) advanced a standard for journalists called “substantial completeness, the point at which a
reasonable reader’s requirements for information are satisfied” (p. 35). This reasonable reader
model was also the gauge that Klaidman and Beauchamp applied to other journalistic virtues,
including accuracy, objectivity, and understanding. This involves empathizing with what a
reasonable reader, or more accurately, the reasonable reader, might expect. The reasonable
reader model brings the discussion close to ideas of reciprocity or reversibility, although
Klaidman and Beauchamp did not invoke these by name.
Instead, they explicitly modeled their reasonable reader threshold on “the reasonable
person” standard applied in legal decisions (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987). The legal standard
is an abstract, hypothetical one in which the reasonable person is not any one actual person.
Thus abstractly conceived, the reasonable reader does not have any unreasonable expectations, as
any actual individual can and probably does. “The reasonable reader, then, is a person with
needs for information about matters such as the risks, alternatives, and consequences of what is
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being reported” (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987, p. 33). However, under the legal standard,
what the hypothetical reasonable person expects from practitioners of a profession need not
conform to the accepted practices of that profession (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987, p. 32). So,
by adopting this model, Klaidman and Beauchamp recommended a set of journalistic standards
that are ethically generalizable, differentiating their work from discussions of established norms
or accepted practices within the industry. This resembles an application of Kant’s categorical
imperative, with the abstract reasonable reader substituted for Kant’s quest for universal laws. In
both instances, an attempt is made to reach a standard outside the individual, but applying it still
involves judgment calls.
Reversibility, a modern name for the psychological mechanism of the ancient Golden
Rule, is simpler to apply, if more subjective in appearance than the reasonable reader standard.
Reversibility amounts to imagining oneself in the other person’s situation. James Jaksa and
Michael Pritchard (1988) used a doctor’s decision whether to delay giving information to a
patient as an example of reversibility. “In principle, Dr. Smith will have to acknowledge that
relevantly similar situations could arise in which someone would be justified in withholding vital
information from her” (p. 68). These thinkers related reversibility both to the justification of
actions and to the universalizability of ethical principles. Jaksa and Pritchard’s book mentioned
the Golden Rule only in a later passage, in regard to appeals to conscience (p. 95), but the
acknowledgement that the hypothetical Dr. Smith is forced to make seems an application of the
rule stated by Jesus in the New Testament as “Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you” and in similar ways in other religious and philosophical traditions.
Martinson (1996-97) explicitly melded substantial completeness and reversibility in
prescribing truthfulness as an achievable goal for public relations practitioners. This prescription
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was needed, he reasoned, in light of the profession’s historic reputation, exemplified by “father
of public relations” Ivy Lee, for creating false impressions with factual statements. Citing Bok
on the distinction between truth and truthfulness and Klaidman and Beauchamp for substantial
completeness, Martinson asserted that the latter can become an objective, or in other words
generalizable, standard. He then footnoted Jaksa and Pritchard for a definition of reversibility
before formulating this maxim in the form of a question for P.R. people: “If the practitioner were
the receiver of the particular communication rather than the transmitter, would he or she still
believe it was substantially complete?” (Martinson, 1996-97, p. 44). Martinson’s rule could
almost be Communicate unto others as you would have them communicate unto you. From the
context of his essay, truthfulness is understood to be paired with completeness. He did not
suggest doing so, but if necessary for clarity, the question could end … truthful and substantially
complete.
Substituting journalist for practitioner then makes this rule a contender to succeed
objectivity as journalism’s core principle. Or, substituting communicator makes substantial
completeness with reversibility a principle for every professional communicator, and perhaps
even for all human beings in their capacity as communicators: If the communicator were the
receiver of the particular communication rather than the transmitter, would he or she still believe
it was truthful and substantially complete? This does not rule out journalists asking themselves
if their expectations are those of a truly typical, reasonable reader. This formulation arguably
steps beyond the Golden Rule’s insistence on what the communicator would wish for herself by
asking the communicator to identify with the receiver. To identify with a variety of potential
readers and viewers, journalists could use the processes of participatory transparency to better
understand their audiences. What journalists learn through participatory practices and
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empathetic thinking could also motivate them to attempt a form of reporting that would be less
biased, or at least inclusive of multiple viewpoints.
Completeness, however, has received scant attention in studies of journalism content and
surveys about journalists’ practices and attitudes. In scholarly articles, the idea appears more
often in evaluations of medical information. For example, Davis (2000) reported two studies
relating the completeness of risk statements about prescription drugs’ side effects to consumer
perceptions of the drugs’ safety and appeal. Dutta-Bergman (2003) explored completeness of
Internet-based health information. Two other communications researchers looked at the
completeness of Wikipedia in comparison to topical books and field-specific academic
encyclopedias (Halavais & Lackaff, 2008). But to find a published article specifically
highlighting completeness as an ethical concern for journalists, this researcher had to look back
to the mid-1990s.
Although Heider (1996) omitted the word substantial, he even quoted Klaidman and
Beauchamp’s definition of substantial completeness as “the point at which a reasonable reader’s
requirements for information are satisfied” (Heider, 1996, p. 5; Klaidman and Beauchamp, 1987,
p. 35). However, what Heider conducted was an ethnographic case study, involving interviews
and observations of Hispanic journalists at five television stations in one city in the American
West. Although completeness was the first word in its title, the article’s only application of the
principle was to relate it to the diversity of the news staffs. “Traditionally, completeness meant
collecting all the pertinent information for a story. But that definition might not have included
the practice of seeking out information from, or perspectives of, people of color” Heider stated in
his conclusion (p. 14). To be clear, the current study reverts to what Heider called the
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traditional meaning of completeness, but with the clarification that substantial completeness
involves not only collecting the pertinent information but also reporting it.
Paradoxically, that supposedly traditional definition, about the inclusion of information,
has received even less attention in research than the considerations Heider raised about the
inclusion of a diversity of people. The connection he made between completeness and
newsroom diversity is important because, again, identifying with the receiver of the information
requires understanding the diversity of viewpoints. And again, the practices suggested by
participatory transparency could be instrumental to such an understanding. But the current study
considers the substantial completeness of stories as an ethical concern for individual journalists.
They were asked whether they think about the completeness of their reporting in terms of what
they as readers would expect. For this specific line of inquiry, this researcher has found no
precedent.
Hypotheses and Research Questions
The researcher ventured only one hypothesis, but sought to answer additional research
questions regarding journalists’ views of how substantial completeness and transparency
compare as ethical priorities. Research questions are often deployed, in preference to
hypotheses, in exploratory research that may be used later to develop hypotheses and for topics
that have been only marginally studied (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). Surely the status of
completeness as an ethical standard for journalists qualifies as marginally studied. The one study
identified that regarded completeness as an ethical concern for journalists (Heider, 1996) viewed
it through case studies from a sociological standpoint. Reporting a series of interviews that
followed a larger survey of journalists, Plaisance and Deppa (2008) quoted specific journalists
who identified completeness as important to how they feel about their work, but these were not
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generalizable results. In search of such results, the current researcher asserted the following
hypothesis regarding substantial completeness as fundamental to his survey.
H1: A majority of American newspaper and newspaper website journalists in 2018 will
view substantial completeness as an ethical obligation when it is described in terms of a
reversible transaction.
Although this hypothesis may appear simplistic, recognition of completeness as an ethical
value by a majority of journalists validates it as a topic of interest in this and future surveys of
journalists’ ethical views and practices. This is not to say that popular acceptance is necessary to
justify a principle as an ethical requirement, but some degree of buy-in seems necessary for
substantial completeness to be asserted as a principle for journalists on which actions can be
based. In the survey, a pair of questions were asked related to the hypothesis. The first
(Appendix A; p. 41, question 5) set the stage by asking whether journalists consider it important
that reporting contain all the information they would want as readers. The second survey
question on this topic (Appendix A; p. 41, question 6) directly tested the hypothesis of whether
journalists consider this an ethical obligation. If the hypothesis failed on the results of this
question, strong showings on the preliminary question and related questions could still have
suggested a need for further research.
No hypotheses were asserted in relation to transparency, but two pairs of survey
questions were posed to take a preliminary look at how journalists prioritize two different forms
of disclosure transparency in comparison to substantial completeness. As previously discussed,
various authors have identified a constellation of different practices as constituting transparency.
Plaisance and Deppa (2009) observed that while certain journalists they interviewed indicated
they put strong personal emphasis on the concept of transparency, “few seemed able to discuss
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its centrality as a critical professional standard” (p. 376). Hellmueller et al. (2012) found that
participatory transparency, namely “including user-generated information and letting readers
contribute to news content” (p. 295), was met with more skepticism by journalists than
factualness, disclosure transparency or neutrality as truth-telling strategies. Seeking to limit the
scope of the current study, the researcher left participatory disclosure aside to focus on the selfrevelatory and process-explanatory aspects of disclosure transparency. These concepts appear,
separately, in the first four of the five research questions that follow. The first and second
research questions form a contrasting pair, pitting completeness against process-explanatory
transparency. Likewise, the third and fourth research questions pit completeness against selfrevelatory transparency. The fifth question seeks to gauge the perceived practicability of
substantial completeness in the newsroom.
RQ1: To what extent do journalists believe that revealing information about how news is
gathered relieves them of any obligation they might have to tell a substantially complete story?
RQ2: To what extent do journalists believe that telling a substantially complete story
relieves them of any obligation to explain how the information was gathered?
RQ3: To what extent do journalists believe that telling a substantially complete story
relieves them of any obligation to reveal information about themselves?
RQ4: To what extent do journalists believe that revealing information about themselves
relieves them of any obligation they might have to tell a substantially complete story?
RQ5: To what extent do journalists believe that telling a substantially complete story is
possible given the time and space constraints of their work environments?
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Operational definitions
For the purposes of the survey, substantial completeness, as referred to in H1, is identical
to telling a substantially complete story, which is the phrase used in all five research questions
(RQ1-RQ5). In the survey instrument (Appendix A), this is equated with a journalist’s firstperson concern “that the reporting contain all the information I would want as a reader to be able
to make my own decisions” (Appendix A, Survey Q5). This concern is an applied principle of
reversible substantial completeness. Although the word reversibility was not used in the survey,
it was explicit in referring to reporting that “is substantially complete from a reader’s
perspective” (Survey Q7).
Process-explanatory disclosure transparency, stated in RQ1 as “revealing information
about how news is gathered” and in RQ2 as “to explain how the information was gathered” was
operationalized in the survey as explaining “how the information was obtained, such as
identifying sources when possible and explaining how they were contacted” (Appendix A,
Survey Q8 & Q12).
Self-revelatory disclosure transparency is that set of practices or principles referred to in
RQ3 and RQ4 as journalists revealing information about themselves. Survey questions
explained this as “transparency about who the reporter is” (Appendix A, Survey Q 10), “such as
organizational or political affiliations that may affect the reporter’s views of the topic” (Survey
Q10 & Q11) but did not limit the possibilities to these examples.
The quantitative element of each of the research questions, “To what extent do journalists
believe …?” was measured through a four-point scale based on the gradations strongly agree,
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree, plus the neutral don’t know/no opinion.
The hypothesis, H1, required only a majority belief to show direction, but degrees of agreement
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or disagreement could be quantified using the same graduations. In the case of the hypothesis
these registered almost exclusively on the agreement end of the scale.
Method
A nationwide survey of journalists, through invitations sent to their workplace email
addresses, yielded 70 responses. A representative random sample of virtually any size
population, providing a 95% confidence level at a probable sampling error rate within plus or
minus 3% on any one question, can be obtained through a survey of fewer than 1,200 people
(Wimmer & Dominick, 2011 p. 109, Table 4.4). However, a national survey of news consumers
was outside the proposed study’s aims and beyond this researcher’s means. Given the lack of
previous attention to completeness and the novelty of comparing it to transparency, a
preliminary, national survey of journalists themselves was proposed to gauge the profession’s
acceptance and ranking of these considerations as ethical principles. Because journalists often
use published email addresses and can be expected to have some familiarity with Internet
resources, they also presented a convenient population to be approached via email and asked to
use an online survey tool, namely SurveyMonkey.
Surveys of journalists are a well-established media research tool. One of the most
sustained efforts has been the series of telephone and online surveys reflected in the American
Journalist and Global Journalist books by David H. Weaver, et al. (1986, 1996, 2007, & 2012)
and Lars Willnat, et al. (2017). The Global Journalist volume (Weaver & Willnat, 2012) in its
chapter on U.S. journalists in the early 21st century (Brownlee & Beam, 2012) briefly notes the
work done in the previous four roughly decennial surveys, going back to 1971. Although the
final sample in the 2002 survey (Weaver & Beam, et al., 2007) consisted of 1,149 U.S.
journalists from print and electronic news media, only 156 daily and 120 weekly newspapers
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were represented (Brownlee & Beam, 2012). Sample sizes for surveys reported in scholarly
articles are often much smaller than the 1,100-plus respondent level. Plaisance & Skewes
(2003), seeking to identify links between journalists’ values and their work roles, conducted a
survey that drew responses from 349 American newspaper journalists, cited as “a national,
probability sample” (Plaisance & Deppa, 2008, p. 336). As has been noted, Hellmueller, Vos,
and Poepsel (2013) surveyed 228 U.S. newspaper journalists. However, to obtain that number of
responses, the team led by Hellmueller initially emailed 499 journalists, which indicates a 45.7%
response rate.
Relatively small samples can yield meaningful results. Although high confidence levels
and a 3% or 5% margin for sampling error are traditional for academic research, they are not
necessary for broad or preliminary studies (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). Furthermore, as
Fowler (2014) observes, "It is unusual for a researcher to be able to specify a desired level of
precision in more than the most general way” (p. 38). For this study, the researcher originally set
out to contact approximately 350 journalists, from a systematic random sampling of U.S.
newspapers, in hope of obtaining 150 responses. This would provide a 95% confidence level
that the real agreement on a particular answer was, at worst, within 8% above or below the
survey result.
Systematic random sampling was applied at the level of selecting newspapers, with some
intentional oversampling meant to ensure that daily newspapers—and among them the largest
newspapers, which are relatively few but employ large numbers of journalists—would be
adequately represented. According to the Editor & Publisher Newspaper Databook (Fleming,
2015), there were 1,331 daily newspapers in the United States as a January 1, 2015. In its second
volume that year, devoted to weeklies, the Databook reported that there were 3,478 paid
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community newspapers and 1,283 free community newspapers, also as of January 1, 2015. The
free and paid categories overlap, but clearly there are more community newspapers than daily
ones. The Editor & Publisher Databook also refers to the community newspapers as weeklies,
although by definition they are published from one to three times a week. The Databook’s
separate listings of daily and weekly newspapers, which are organized alphabetically by state and
then by city, provided the sampling frame.
As first proposed, this study would have used an elaborate procedure to ensure that
journalists with differing amounts of experience were contacted. The three different versions of
the initial contact message (Appendix B) were to be directed to an editorial staff member at each
newspaper, asking them to identify journalists with different levels of seniority who would then
be invited to take the survey. After emailing initial contact messages to editors at 70 newspapers
on March 27, 2017, the researcher abandoned this multilayered invitation process. Only five
editors responded with suggestions of journalists to include, and their recommendations were
eventually incorporated into the address lists for the survey invitation email (Appendix C).
For most of the journalists who were sent the survey link, the researcher used the Editor
& Publisher Newspaper Databook (Fleming, 2015) only to select the newspapers, applying the
randomizing procedures described below. The researcher then searched the newspapers’
websites for email addresses, preferring those of reporters with recently published bylines and
editors listed in current directories. This approach using websites was also allowed in the
procedures approved by the University of Memphis Institutional Review Board (Appendix G,
IRB Approval).
The original plan was to send the survey invitations to about 350 journalists. The
researcher used a varied series of counting procedures to randomize the selection of newspapers.
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First, from the list of the 100 largest daily newspapers, a sample of 10 newspapers was selected
through the use of a counting sequence from a random numbers list (Wimmer & Dominick,
2011, p. 425, Table 1, starting with the bottom row), interpreting the random number 0 (zero) as
the 10th newspaper after the previous one selected and the random number 1 as the next
newspaper after the previous one. The 100 largest dailies constituted 7.5% of the 1,331 dailies,
and the oversampling of 10 large newspapers provided 5.9% of the first 170 contacts with
dailies.
Then, from the Databook’s (Fleming, 2015) general list of 1,331 dailies, the eighth
newspaper and every eighth newspaper after it were chosen until 160 newspapers were selected
by this method. In some cases a newspaper was found to be out of business or to have no
current, specific email addresses, and the newspaper immediately before or after the eighth in
series was substituted. Finally, from the Databook’s (Fleming, 2015) lists of paid and free
community newspapers, treated as a continuous whole, the fifth newspaper and then every 25th
newspaper after it were to be selected until 180 newspapers were identified by this method,
interpreted to include at least one newspaper from every state. However, when some of the 25th
newspapers in series were out of business or did not have working email addresses, the 20th
newspaper was chosen instead, or the newspaper immediately before or after the 20th or 25th.
Using these same processes for newspaper selection, the researcher increased the number
of addresses in the list to 400. On April 11 and 12, 2018, the survey invitation email (Appendix
C) was sent to the first 400 addresses. After approximately 50 of those emails bounced back or
produced autoreplies indicating that the journalists were no longer with the identified
publications, the researcher eventually added an equal number of replacement addresses. The
first-reminder email (Appendix D) was sent to 350 journalists’ addresses May 7, 2018, the
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approximately 50 that produced bounces or autoreplies having been removed from the list. Then
the survey invitation email was sent to added replacement addresses June 14 and June 27. The
first-reminder email was sent to the added addresses July 16. Finally, the researcher sent the last
reminder email (Appendix E) to all 400 addresses believed valid on July 30, 2018, and closed the
survey collector Aug. 10, 2018.
Results
Demographics
National in reach if not in grasp, the survey link was sent to email addresses of journalists
in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The invitation and reminders eventually went to
400 journalists’ apparently valid email addresses. How many of the invitations remained unseen
in heaping junk-mail folders is unknown. In the end, exactly 70 cumulative survey responses
were counted by SurveyMonkey. This amounts to a 17.5% response rate from those whose
email accounts apparently received the survey invitations.
However, only two of the questions were actually answered by all 70 respondents,
including the first question (Appendix F, Survey Q1), asking journalists their primary job role.
Of those who responded, 36 identified as reporters. Another 26 were editors. So of those who
started the survey, a little over 51% were reporters and 37% were editors. Another eight
respondents chose “other,” and these included one “reporter, editor and photographer,” one
“owner,” one “community/arts and entertainment editor and columnist,” one “editor and
publisher,” another “publisher,” one “reporter/photographer/columnist/social media/webpage
administrator,” another “reporter, photographer, editor and webmaster,” and another
“editor/publisher,” as self-reported in a write-in space. No respondents identified purely as
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photographers or sports writers, which were checkable choices. The researcher had intentionally
included some photographers and sports writers or editors in the email addressing.
The number of respondents dipped to 69 with the second question (Appendix F, Survey
Q2), asking how many years each has worked in journalism. Their responses show a good
dispersion of experience levels, with 16 journalists having been in the profession five years or
less, 15 journalists who have served 35 years or more, and from four to eight respondents filling
each of the five-year service brackets between. A third question, asking where each journalist’s
work is primarily published, was the last survey item to bring all 70 respondents aboard
(Appendix F, Survey Q3). Of these, 34 indicated that their work is regularly published both in a
newspaper and on its website, while 33 indicated that their work appears primarily in a printed
newspaper. So, with more than 48.5% published both on a newspaper and newspaper website
and more than 47% primarily in a printed newspaper, the respondents were clearly in the target
population of newspaper and newspaper website journalists. In fact, another two respondents
reported that their work is published primarily on a website, while the one remaining journalist
checked “other” and explained that this meant appearing in a “print version six days a week,
online seven days a week.” The number of participants dropped to 69 again with the fourth
question, asking gender, but with 35 female and 34 male respondents, the survey could not have
drawn a more balanced sample in this respect.
For the fifth survey item through the 10th survey item, beginning with the two questions
directly pertinent to the hypothesis, 65 respondents answered each question. At the 11th survey
item, which relates transparency to reporters revealing organizational or political affiliations,
participation dropped to 64 individuals. Then 63 journalists answered the 12th, 13th, and 14th
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items, and only 62 responded to the 15th and final item. However, strong levels of affirmation
on several of the survey statements compensate for the limited participation.

Hypothesis
Despite the small sample size, the hypothesis is amply confirmed. More than 95% of
respondents answered either “agree” or “strongly agree” on both of the survey items used to
operationalize the hypothesis, and more than 80% of respondents answered “strongly agree” to
both assertions. The first of the two assertions reflected the hypothesis more generically,
positing the idea of substantial completeness as important for empowering decision making
without referring to this as an ethical obligation for journalists: “When I am reporting on a
subject or supervising how it is reported, it is important to me that the reporting contain all the
information I would want as a reader to be able to make my own decisions” (Appendix F, Survey
Q5). Of the 65 journalists who responded to this assertion, 61 individuals, or 93.85 percent
(MOE = ±5.84%, CI = 95%, z = 1.96), selected “strongly agree.” Subtracting the margin of
error, this indicates with a high level of confidence that at least 88% of the target population
would also strongly agree. The other four journalists who answered, or 6.15% of all
respondents, selected “somewhat agree.” So, 100% of those who responded at all agreed with
the assertion to some extent. None availed themselves of other possible choices: “somewhat
disagree,” “strongly disagree” or “don’t know/no opinion.”
Following immediately after that item, the next survey question tested the hypothesis
directly by asserting that “(m)aking reporting substantially complete, so that it contains all the
information that the journalist would want as a reader, is an ethical obligation for a journalist”
(Appendix F, Survey Q6). In effect the previous question served to introduce the idea of
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substantial completeness as giving recipients of information the ability to make their own
decisions, and this question put it to the direct test as a perceived ethical obligation. Of the 65
journalists who responded to this question, 53 individuals, or 81.54% of the respondents (MOE =
±9.432%, CI=95%, z=1.96), strongly agreed with the assertion, and this alone is sufficient to
confirm the hypothesis with a high degree of confidence for the target population. Subtracting
the margin of error indicates that at least 72.1% of the actual target population would strongly
agree. Another 11 journalists, or 16.92% of those responding, agreed but did not strongly agree,
for a total of 64 journalists, or 98.46%, agreeing or strongly agreeing with the assertion of ethical
obligation. The one other journalist, being 1.54% of the 65 respondents, indicated that she or he
somewhat disagreed with the assertion. No journalists selected “strongly disagree” or “don’t
know/no opinion.”
Because the test instrument was a survey and the hypothesis sought only majority
acceptance, a test of the results’ significance to the hypothesis as such is unnecessary. More to
the point, because the margin of error for a sample size decreases as the percentage of a
particular response increases, the hypothesis results are shown to be significantly reflective of the
overall target population. Applying the margin of error formula MOE = z √ [p (1-p) / n] and
using the accepted value z = 1.96 for a confidence level of CI = 95%, a combined affirmative
response of 98.46% obtained from a sample of 65 respondents yields a margin of error of
±2.99%. This suggests that at least 95.47% of American newspaper and newspaper website
journalists would either agree or strongly agree that making reporting substantially complete is
an ethical obligation.
However, the researcher senses something suspect in analyzing the hypothesis-affirming
responses collectively in this way, with the “somewhat” and “strongly” responses combined as a
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single “yes” response. Treating these responses separately yields much larger margins of error,
and this is the way respondents actually made their choices, selecting single levels of agreement,
not a combination of two. For the 16.92% of respondents who merely “somewhat agree,” the
margin of error becomes ±9.115%, providing a range of 7.8% to 26% of American newspaper
and newspaper website journalists (CI=95%) who agree at this level. The ±9.432% margin of
error for the 81.54% strong agreement response indicated a range of 72.1% to 90.97%.
Assuming maximum overlap and simply adding the lower ends of both ranges (72.1% + 7.8%)
affirms, maintaining the confidence level of 95%, that at least 79.9% of American newspaper
and newspaper website journalists agree or strongly agree that making reporting substantially
complete is an ethical obligation.
So, on the basis of even this limited study, the researcher is confident that a majority of
American newspaper and newspaper website journalists in 2018 view—or would view—
substantial completeness as an ethical obligation when it is described in terms of a reversible
transaction. However, the researcher is wary both of the level of self-selection apparent in the
relatively small number of journalists who bothered to respond to such a survey and the
possibility that the preceding framing question—whose 100% “yes” response will not be
submitted to further analysis—was also a leading question or even a coaxing question. These
limitations will be explored in greater detail in the discussion section.
Research Questions
Overview. Together, the first four of the five research questions attempt to establish
whether substantial completeness or two specific varieties of transparency ethic have priority in
journalists’ perceptions. These questions form two contrasting pairs. Paired RQ1 and RQ2
relate substantial completeness to transparency about how the news was gathered, while paired
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RQ3 and RQ4 relate substantial completeness to transparency in the form of journalists’
revealing information about themselves. Each research question was directly operationalized by
one survey item. However, the survey item directly pertaining to each research question
followed other survey items that helped define the types of transparency under consideration, and
those items in turn followed the two survey items—those already noted as pertinent to the
hypothesis—that defined the idea of substantial completeness. Finally, RQ5 stands alone,
operationalized by a single survey item relating substantial completeness to time and space
constraints.
RQ1. In answer to the first research question, most responding journalists do not believe
that revealing information about how news is gathered relieves them of an obligation to tell a
substantially complete story. RQ1 was operationalized in one survey item (Appendix F, Survey
Results Q12) requesting a response to the statement: “When a story reveals how the information
was obtained, such as identifying sources when possible and explaining how they were
contacted, this relieves the reporter of any further obligation to tell a complete story that includes
all the information the reporter would want if he or she were the reader.” Of the 63 journalists
who responded, 46 individuals, or 73.02%, strongly disagreed with this statement. Another 14
individuals, or 22.22%, somewhat disagreed with it. This gives a total of 60 individuals, or a
combined 95.2%, who rejected the proposition to a great or lesser extent. Only two individuals,
or 3.17%, somewhat agreed with the statement, and none strongly agreed with it, but one chose
“don’t know/no opinion.” So on the one hand, a large majority of respondents do not believe
that process-revelatory transparency trumps substantial completeness.
RQ2. On the other hand, in answer to RQ2, most of the journalists who responded do not
believe that substantial completeness obviates the need for some transparency about the reporting
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process, either. This research question was conveyed directly in the survey item (Appendix F,
Survey Q14) vetting the statement: “When reporting is complete from the reader’s perspective,
including all the information the journalist would want if he or she were that reader, this relieves
the journalist of any further obligation to reveal how the information was obtained.” Of the 63
journalists who responded, 34 individuals, or 53.97%, strongly disagreed with this statement. An
additional 20 individuals, or 31.75%, somewhat disagreed with it. So a total of 54 respondents,
or a combined 85.71%, rejected the statement to a greater or lesser degree. Six individuals, or
9.52%, somewhat agreed with the statement, one journalist, or 1.59%, strongly agreed with it,
and two journalists, or 3.17% of all respondents, chose “don’t know/no opinion.” As will be
discussed further, the high levels of disagreement with the direct assertion of both RQ1 and RQ2
do not so much contradict each other as indicate that many journalists see both substantial
completeness and transparency about sources and methods as important.
Two preceding survey items (Appendix F, Survey Q8 and Q9) gave respondents context
for this variety of transparency. Of 65 journalists who responded to the assertion that explaining
“how the information was obtained, such as identifying sources when possible and explaining
how they were contacted” (Survey Q8) is important, 44 individuals, or 67.69%, strongly agreed
and 20 individuals, or 30.77% somewhat agreed, while one individual, or 1.54%, somewhat
disagreed. So the importance of this form of transparency was acknowledged, to a greater or
lesser extent, by a combined 98.46% of those responding. Their levels of agreement then
corroborated their contrasting rejection of the RQ2 statement, as posed in Survey Q14.
Of 65 journalists also responding to the statement that transparency about sources and
methods rises to the level of ethical obligation (Survey Q9), 42 individuals, or 64.62%, strongly
agreed, and 21 individuals, or 32.31% somewhat agreed, while one individual, or 1.54%,
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strongly disagreed. Another individual indicated “don’t know/no opinion,” but there were no
respondents who only somewhat disagreed. With 63 of 65 respondents either strongly or
somewhat agreeing, their combined level of a partial to total acceptance of this form of
transparency as an ethical obligation was 96.92%.
RQ 3. To the third research question, this study revealed ambivalence among responding
journalists as a group on whether telling a substantially complete story removes any obligation
for self-revelatory transparency. Conveying RQ3 directly, the last item in the survey (Appendix
F, Survey Q15) asserted that when reporting “is complete … including the information the
journalist would want” as the reader, this relieves journalists of any further obligation to reveal
things about themselves. Of the 62 who responded, 19 individuals, or 30.65%, somewhat
disagreed, and 13 individuals, or 20.97%, strongly disagreed with this statement. Meanwhile, 17
individuals, or 27.42% of all respondents, somewhat agreed with the statement, and another 13,
again 20.97%, strongly agreed with it.
Two survey items (Appendix F, Survey Q10 and Q11) meant to underpin the comparison
presented by RQ3 and RQ4 also produced mixed results. The first of these items (Survey Q10)
introduced political affiliations as an example: “When reporting a story, it is important to reveal
information about who the reporter is, such as organizational or political affiliations that may
affect the reporter’s views of the topic.” Of the 65 journalists who responded, 23 individuals, or
35.38% strongly disagreed with this statement, while 15 individuals, or 23.08%, somewhat
disagreed. So a total of 38 individuals, or 58.46%, weighed in as disagreeing this assertion.
Meanwhile, 13 individuals, or 20% of the total, somewhat agreed with the statement, and 12
individuals, 18.46%, strongly agreed with it, while two respondents, 3.08%, chose “don’t
know/no opinion,” here counted as a neutral response. Finally, the survey item (Q11) positing
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that this form of transparency is an ethical obligation yielded the most ambiguous result in the
survey, although not a result directly related to a research question. Of the 64 journalists who
responded, 18 individuals (28.13%) strongly disagreed with the assertion, 15 individuals
(23.44%) somewhat disagreed, another 15 (again, 23.44%) somewhat agreed, and 14 individuals
(21.88%) strongly agreed, while two (3.13%) expressed “don’t know/no opinion.”
RQ 4. However, the response on the survey item (Appendix F, Survey Q13) directly
operationalizing the fourth research question yielded an unambiguous collective response. Most
respondents do not believe that revealing information about themselves, at least a particular sort
of information, relieves them of an obligation to be substantially complete in what they report.
The survey item used “such as organizational or political affiliations that may affect the
reporter’s views of the topic” as an example of the kind of revelation of “who a reporter is”
expected to obviate “any further obligation to tell a complete story.” Of the 63 journalists who
responded, 50 individuals (79.37%) strongly disagreed with the assertion, 10 individuals
(15.87%) somewhat disagreed, only one (1.59%) somewhat agreed, and none strongly agreed,
while two (3.17%) expressed “don’t know/no opinion. Worth noting here, the “political
affiliations” example was not included in the generically worded survey item (Q15) that yielded
a more mixed result for RQ3.
RQ 5. In response to the final research question, a majority of respondents believe they
have time and space to tell a substantially complete story. The seventh survey item tested this in
an inverted form. Of the 65 journalists who responded, 34 individuals, or 52.31%, strongly
disagreed with the statement that “(a)t our publication, time and space constraints make it
impossible for us to be concerned about whether our reporting is substantially complete from a
reader’s perspective” (Appendix F, Survey Q7). Another16 individuals, or 24.62%, somewhat
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disagreed with the assertion, making the total who disagreed with the statement to one extent or
the other 76.92%. Again applying MOE = z √ [p (1-p) / n] and using the accepted value z =
1.96 (CI = 95%) indicates a margin of error of ±10.24% for the combined disagreement
response, suggesting that at least 66.68% of the target population would agree with the assertion.
Breaking this down to allow for any overlapping error in the actual responses, the margin of
error for the 52.32% strong disagreement response is ±12.14%, making the range 40.18% to
64.46%. But MOE = ±10.47% for the “somewhat” disagreement level of 24.62%, giving a
range of 14.15% to 35.09%. Adding the floor levels of those ranges (40.18% + 14.15%) gives
54.33%, showing that at least that portion of the target population of journalists, a majority,
would reject the statement to a greater or lesser extent (CI = 95%). Meanwhile, 14 survey
respondents, or 21.54%, somewhat agreed that time and space constraints at their publication
make the studied form of substantial completeness impossible, while one individual, or 1.54% of
those responding, strongly agreed.
Discussion
To mean anything, a profession’s ethics must be more than defensive routines or strategic
rituals, believed even by practitioners to be motivated by profits, company loyalty or selfprotection. As a profession where truthfulness and trust are essential, journalism needs ethical
principles that rise to the level of pro attitudes or asserted reasons capable of guiding and even
motivating action, and could benefit from having a central principle in which others are
grounded. An ethical principle should also have some basis in actual moral reasoning, and a
principle for communication requires a basis in the justice of human interactions. This study has
shown that a majority of newspaper and newspaper website journalists in the United States
would accept substantial completeness, described specifically as reporting containing “all the
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information I would want as a reader to be able to make my own decisions” (Appendix F, Survey
Q5) as important. Further, in confirmation of this study’s hypothesis, they view making
reporting substantially complete in this way as “an ethical obligation for a journalist” (Appendix
F, Survey Q6). To the extent that these survey results can be trusted, relatively few journalists
will maintain that time and space constraints in their particular situations make such reporting
impossible. Therefore, the researcher concludes that substantial completeness with reversibility
both would be acceptable to most U.S. newspaper and newspaper website journalists as an
ethical obligation and is seen by them as practicable in their work environment.
Nonetheless, a considerable element of self-selection among the participants to a survey
such as this must be acknowledged. Firstly, any respondents to this survey will have become
aware of it by first receiving an invitation email (Appendix C) or noticing at least one of two
reminder emails (Appendices D & E), all of which noted that the survey concerns completeness
and transparency in reporting. The first two of those emailed notices also stated that the survey
was about whether these are “useful as guiding principles in reporting and editing” (Appendices
C & D). Secondly, when would-be respondents advanced to the survey itself, they saw as the
first page the informed consent document, which stated, “The survey’s specific purpose is to
measure the extent to which journalists see transparency and completeness in reporting as ethical
obligations” (Appendix A, first page). Ironically, informed consent requirements and the
researcher’s ethical compliance, or perhaps over-compliance, made a clean survey on an ethical
topic impossible in regard to self-selection. Although not necessarily all actively interested in
journalism ethics, respondents at least saw themselves as having time for a survey on such a
topic.
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Additionally, on the question of whether time and space constraints render substantially
complete reporting impossible, more journalists who might have said so were probably excluded
by those very—if only perceived—time demands. Perhaps relevant here, the informed consent
document predicted “about 10 minutes” (Appendix A, p. 54) as the survey completion time, and
SurveyMonkey dashboard showed the actual average completion time as four minutes.
Regardless, an industry where time constraints rendered a felt ethical obligation impossible to
fulfill would need to make other changes, not abandon that obligation.
This study made substantial completeness with reversibility its focus both because very
little research had been done on the topic and because it offered the possibility of a clean
definition around a core principle. As shown in the literature review, a variety of concepts and
practices, not always of equal weight or clarity, had already been piled under the rubric of
transparency. But as also previously acknowledged, a number of the transparency practices do
have value from an ethical standpoint, and the concepts of transparency and substantial
completeness certainly are not mutually exclusive. Significant majorities of respondents also
agreed that transparency about how information is gathered, including identifying sources when
possible and how they were contacted, is both important and an ethical obligation for journalists.
Although identified as a form of transparency in one of the supporting survey questions, this
could also be seen as a part of telling a substantially complete story from the reader’s
perspective. Perhaps research could be done to sort out whether the perceived motive for
including such information is transparency or completeness, but either would suffice.
As to whether telling a substantially complete story relieves journalists of any further
obligation to reveal information about how the information was obtained, a combined 85.71%
(MOE = ±8.64%, CI=95%, z=1.96) of respondents either somewhat or strongly disagreed.
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Meanwhile, a combined 95.24% (MOE = ±5.26%, CI=95%, z=1.96) somewhat or strongly
disagreed with the proposition that revealing how the information was obtained, including
identifying sources and how they were contacted, would relieve them of the obligation to tell a
substantially complete story. So the safest interpretation is that journalists view this form of
disclosure transparency and substantial completeness both as priorities, and do not believe that
the fulfillment of one obligation obviates the other.
Far fewer respondents were willing to accept a form of disclosure transparency that
required revealing a reporter’s organizational and political affiliations even though these “may
affect the reporter’s views of the topic” (Appendix F, Survey Q10 and Q11). Of those who
responded, 58.46% (MOE = ±11.98%, CI=95%, z=1.96) rejected this as important and 51.5%
(MOE = ±12.24%, CI=95%, z=1.96) rejected it as an ethical obligation. Given the large margins
of error for results this close to the 50-50 break for a small sample size, these results cannot be
generalized to the whole population of U.S. newspaper and newspaper website journalists. But if
a similar mixed result or stronger rejection were attained from a study with an improved sample,
this would not be surprising given Richardson’s (2009) observations about American news
organization’s reluctance to reveal political leanings, which sometimes extends to bans on
reporters becoming active in social and political organizations. Certainly such reluctance runs
contrary to any Habermasian imperative for communicators to reveal “their individual lifehistories, their identities, their needs and wants, their traditions, membership and so forth”
(Habermas, 1982, p. 255, italics in original). But Allen (2008) may be justified to caution that
oversharing could damage journalists’ efforts to build public trust, and Plaisance (2007) similarly
warned against “transparency unmediated by other values” (p. 192).

42

Again, when this form of self-revelatory transparency, dubious to more than half of the
responding journalists, was put up against substantial completeness with concern for the reader,
collectively 95.2% of respondents rejected self-revelatory transparency as sufficient to relieve
them of the obligation to tell a substantially complete story. But when the question was turned
the opposite way, 51.61% (MOE = ±12.44%, CI=95%, z=1.96) somewhat or strongly rejected
the suggestion that telling a substantially complete story would relieve them of any obligation to
reveal such things about themselves, while a corresponding 48.39% strongly or somewhat
rejected it. Again, no conclusion about a majority opinion can be generalized from such a close
split in a small sample. But all of this suggests a line of research into whether journalists would
be benefitted or harmed by revealing political affiliations, which is interesting but tangential to
the current study.
Obviously, much in this study depended on operational definitions and the wording of
survey questions. To have asked journalists simply if they believe that transparency is important
in their work or an ethical obligation might have produced responses. But given the myriad
practices and concepts associated with transparency, this would have meant virtually nothing.
Instead, two specific types of disclosure transparency were defined in the survey questions. A
survey asking directly and without explanation whether journalists view substantial completeness
with reversibility as an obligation would have been even more preposterous. At best, it might
have resulted in some emails asking for more information. Instead, this form of completeness
was defined in the survey questions as reporting that contains all the information the journalist
would want as a reader to be able to make his or her own decisions. This is all it means, and that
is the beauty of substantial completeness with reversibility as an ethical guiding principle. It
need not be associated with other practices, rituals or routines not directed toward the stated end.

43

If questions that give definitions are necessarily leading questions, and if a survey that
asks about practices that might be ethical obligations necessarily coaxes respondents to answer
that these are indeed obligations, then the survey unintentionally both led and coaxed. That even
45 percent of respondents chose to agree that revealing their political affiliations is an ethical
obligation could hint at such an unintended bias. However, comparing that to the more than 98%
level of agreement that telling a substantially complete story is an ethical obligation shows that
respondents were thinking differently in regard to the individual practices.
Substantial completeness is a general concept, so further study of how it can be applied is
warranted. This researcher, in a paper presented several years ago at an academic conference
(Hackle, 2014), suggested one potentially controversial area for the application and study of
substantial completeness, the question of when the race of suspects and victims should be
included in crime stories, understood to entail the race of police officers in stories about officerinvolved shootings. After noting how quickly race became an issue in the then-recent fatal
shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed, 18-year-old Black man, by a White police officer in
Ferguson, Missouri, the conference paper briefly outlined the work of other researchers on the
prevalence of race mentions in news reports. The author noted that objectivity more often
suggests what to leave out of a story than what to include and that disclosure transparency
generally says nothing about news content as such. Participatory transparency practices might
arrive at an answer by involving the audience. But the central question of substantial
completeness with reversibility—whether the communicators would think that the information
was complete if they were its recipients—provided the clearest guideline, the author concluded.
Journalists answered this question in the Michael Brown case by reporting race as
relevant, indeed as central to the story. Some might also answer it by reporting, as a kind
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of baseline, how often unarmed citizens are killed by police officers of the same race.
(Hackle, 2014, p. 21)
Unfortunately, police shootings, crime reporting and race remain a potentially fertile field for
research into the application of substantial completeness.
This area of application also suggests limitations of the reversibility concept, because
reporters cannot simultaneously fulfill the desires of all readers and should not specify race in
stories where it would be relevant only to readers with racist motives. So, something akin to the
reasonable reader standard (Klaidman & Beauchamp, 1987) must be maintained. An assumption
of reversibility is that, in the effort to identify with news consumers, journalists will think
about the decision-making needs of those who are as reasonable as themselves but who differ in
other ways. Another line of questioning, not pursued here, should make explicit whether
journalists actively consider the needs of news consumers whose political views and life
situations are markedly different from their own.
Conclusion
Journalistic objectivity, long considered a core principle, has been questioned in its
foundations and undermined by critics for at least 50 years. This study examined transparency
and substantial completeness as possible successors, with a special focus on completeness as less
often researched and capable of being asserted as a specific ethical maxim. Transparency, like
objectivity before it, has been associated with a number of varied practices that do not
necessarily form a coherent package. However, key practices of transparency, such as revealing
methods as well as sources when possible, are not only compatible with but called for by
substantial completeness.
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The advantage of substantial completeness is that it can be boiled down to a single
question, to be answered many times in the process of reporting different stories. A majority of
American newspaper journalists clearly will accept substantial completeness as an ethical
principle of importance when it is explained to them. Besides the survey’s main purpose as a
research instrument, it had a secondary purpose, to inform. This year, at least for an average of
four minutes each, 70 working journalists scattered across the nation thought about substantial
completeness in terms of giving readers what they need to make their own decisions.
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Appendix A

Survey of newspaper and online journalists
(In SurveyMonkey format; begins on next page with informed consent document.)
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Informed Consent:
Thank you for participating in this survey, which is being used for academic research into
journalists’ opinions. It consists of 15 questions and should take about 10 minutes to complete.
Your thoughtful responses and honesty are important.
The survey’s specific purpose is to measure the extent to which journalists see transparency and
completeness in reporting as ethical obligations. After four basic questions about you, items 5-15
ask you to rate statements about the research topic on an agreement-disagreement scale.
I do not anticipate that taking this survey will involve any risk or inconvenience to you.
Furthermore, your participation is strictly voluntary and you may withdraw it at any time without
penalty. All information collected will be used only for my research, and there will be no
connection to you specifically in the results. Your contact information and name will be kept
confidential. Once the study is completed, I would be happy to share the results with you if you
desire. In the meantime, if you have any questions please ask, or contact me:
Alvie P. Hackle
aphackle@memphis.edu
Or you may contact my faculty advisor:
Dr. David Arant,
Chair, Department of Journalism,
The University of Memphis
darant@memphis.edu
Additionally, if you have any concerns about your treatment and rights as a participant in this
study, please call or email the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at
irb@memphis.edu or at 901‐678‐ 2705. Although the administrator may ask your name, all
complaints are kept in confidence.
By clicking the Next Page button below you are affirming that you have read the explanation of the
study, that you are at least 18 years old and that you agree to participate. Please read all questions
carefully and answer all that you feel are appropriate.
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Transparency and Completeness in Reporting: 15 Questions
Basic info about you and your work

1. What is your primary role as a journalist? Please check one:

Reporter
Editor

Photographer or
photojournalist

Sports writer

Other (please specify; for example, columnist, reviewer, opinion writer)

2. How many years have you been working as a journalist?

5 or less

6-10

11-15

16-20

21-25

26-30

31-35

more than 35

3. Where is the work you produce or edit (or that of journalists you supervise) primarily published?

In a printed newspaper
On a website

Regularly both in a newspaper and on its website
Other (please specify)

4. What is your gender?

55

Female
Male

Transparency and Completeness in Reporting: 15 Questions
Your view: transparency or completeness

5. When I am reporting on a subject or supervising how it is reported, it is important to me that the reporting
contain all the information I would want as a reader to be able to make my own decisions.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

6. Making reporting substantially complete, so that it contains all the information that the journalist would want
as a reader, is an ethical obligation for a journalist.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

7. At our publication, time and space constraints make it impossible for us to be concerned about whether our
reporting is substantially complete from a reader’s perspective.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

8. When reporting or editing a story, it is important to explain how the information was obtained, such as
identifying sources when possible and explaining how they were contacted.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

9. Transparency in how information is gathered, such as identifying sources when possible and explaining how
they were contacted, is an ethical obligation for a journalist.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree
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Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

10. When reporting a story, it is important to reveal information about who the reporter is, such as
organizational or political affiliations that may affect the reporter’s views of the topic.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

11. Transparency about who the reporter is, revealing things such as organizational or political affiliations that
may affect the reporter’s views of the topic, is an ethical obligation for a journalist.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

Transparency and Completeness in Reporting: 15 Questions
Your priorities: how these ideas stack up

12. When a story reveals how the information was obtained, such as identifying sources when possible and
explaining how they were contacted, this relieves the reporter of any further obligation to tell a complete story
that includes all the information the reporter would want if he or she were the reader.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

13. When a story reveals who the reporter is, such as organizational or political affiliations that may affect the
reporter’s views of the topic, this relieves the reporter of any further obligation to tell a complete story that
includes all the information the reporter would want if he or she were the reader.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

14. When reporting is complete from the reader’s perspective, including all the information the journalist
would want if he or she were that reader, this relieves the journalist of any further obligation to reveal how
the information was obtained.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree
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Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

15. When reporting is complete from the reader’s perspective, including all the information the journalist would
want if he or she were that reader, this relieves the journalist of any further obligation to reveal information
about himself or herself.
Strongly agree

Somewhat agree

Somewhat disagree

Thank you for completing our survey!
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Strongly disagree

Don’t know/No opinion

Appendix B
Initial contact messages
Each first newspaper contacted:
Hello [insert contact name here or used Fellow Journalist if no name determined]:
I’m both a newspaper reporter and a University of Memphis graduate student working on a thesis in
journalism ethics. I’m surveying journalists about whether they see transparency and completeness in
reporting as ethical requirements. As we seek a variety of respondents, we’re asking that you direct us
to one of the two members of your reporting and editing staff who have worked there the longest.
Would you please respond with the name and email address of one such willing survey participant, or
you could respond yourself if you fit the category.
Thanks, Al Hackle
aphackle@memphis.edu

Each second newspaper contacted:
Hello [insert contact name here or used Fellow Journalist if no name determined]:
I’m both a newspaper reporter and a University of Memphis graduate student working on a thesis in
journalism ethics. I’m surveying journalists about whether they see transparency and completeness in
reporting as ethical requirements. As we seek a variety of respondents, we’re asking that you direct us
to for one of the two newest members of your reporting and editing staff. Would you please respond
with the name and email address of one such willing survey participant, or you could respond yourself if
you fit the category.
Thanks, Al Hackle
aphackle@memphis.edu

Each third newspaper contacted:
Hello [insert contact name here or used Fellow Journalist if no name determined]:
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I’m both a newspaper reporter and a University of Memphis graduate student working on a thesis in
journalism ethics. I’m surveying journalists about whether they see transparency and completeness in
reporting as ethical requirements. We’re asking that you direct us to a member of your editorial staff
who is neither the longest serving nor the newest (unless those are the only staff members available, in
which case either will do). Would you please respond with the name and email address of one such
willing survey participant, or you could respond yourself if you fit the category.
Thanks, Al Hackle
aphackle@memphis.edu
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Appendix C
Survey invitation email
Transparency and Completeness
in Reporting: 15 Questions

Dear fellow journalist,
As a University of Memphis graduate student in journalism and also a working reporter, I am
conducting a survey about completeness and transparency and whether these are – or aren’t – useful as
guiding principles in reporting and editing. Your cooperation and input are greatly appreciated as we
attempt to obtain a national sample of newspaper and newspaper website journalists.
This should take less than 10 minutes to complete. You will be asked for a limited amount of
personal info that will be used to determine how journalists’ views of the subject may vary according to
factors such job assignment or years of experience. However, your name will not be linked to your
response, and no individual respondents will be identified either by names or their workplaces in the
published results.
The survey does not ask your age, but only journalists age 18 and up should participate. Clicking here
on Go-to-Survey will take you to the survey on SurveyMonkey, where the first page serves as an
informed consent document.
Thank you,
Al Hackle
aphackle@memphis.edu
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Appendix D
First reminder email
Journalists’ Transparency & Completeness Survey
Thank You! If You Have / Reminder if You Haven’t

Dear working journalist,
I’m the full-time journalist and sometime University of Memphis graduate student who contacted you a
couple of weeks ago for my survey about whether completeness and transparency are useful as guiding
principles in reporting and editing. Because the survey platform doesn’t attach responses to email
addresses, I’ve no way of knowing whether you have completed the survey. So if you have, I’d like to
thank you very much,* and if you haven’t, I’d like to remind you of the survey and ask again, as I’m
trying to get a representative sample.
The survey includes 15 questions and should take about 10 minutes to complete. It does not ask your
age, but only journalists age 18 and up should participate. Clicking here on Go-to-Survey will take you
to the survey on SurveyMonkey, where the first page serves as an informed consent document.
Thank you,
Al Hackle
aphackle@memphis.edu
*If you completed the survey, please do not attempt to take it again. But if you did a portion of the
survey, you should be able to return to it and pick up where you left off. Just please make sure you click
the “Done” button at the end when you’re finished.
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Appendix E
Last reminder email
Last chance to help out with my
Journalism Transparency & Completeness Survey

Dear working journalist,
Remember me? I’m the University of Memphis graduate student in journalism doing the survey about
completeness and transparency in reporting. If you’ve already completed it, please accept a great big
“THANKS!” and don’t worry, this is my last notice to everyone.
But if anyone still hasn’t done the survey* and needs one more chance, remember, the survey includes
15 questions and should take less than 10 minutes to complete, and your name won’t be connected with
it. It does not ask your age, but only journalists age 18 and up should participate. Just clicking on the
link here, Go-to-Survey, will take you to the survey on SurveyMonkey, where the first page serves as
an informed consent document.

Thank you,
Al Hackle
aphackle@memphis.edu

*If you completed the survey, please do not attempt to take it again. But if you did a portion of the
survey, you should be able to return to it and pick up where you left off. Just please make sure you click
the “Done” button at the end when you’re finished.
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Appendix F
SurveyMonkey data summary

Q1 What is your primary role as a journalist? Please check
one:
Answered: 70
Skipped: 0

Reporter

Editor

Photogra
p
h
e
r
o
r
.
.
.

Sports Writer

Other
(please
specify;
for...

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

ANSWER CHOICES

50%

60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

RESPONSES

Reporter

51.43%

36

Editor

37.14%

26

Photographer or photojournalist

0.00%

0

Sports Writer

0.00%

0

Other (please specify; for example, columnist, reviewer, opinion writer)

11.43%

8

TOTAL

70

64

Q2 How many years have you been working as a journalist?
Answered: 69

Skipped: 1

5 or less

6-10

11-15

16-20

21-25

26-30

31-35

more than 35

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES

RESPONSES

5 or less

23.19%

16

6-10

8.70%

6

11-15

8.70%

6

16-20

10.14%

7

21-25

11.59%

8

26-30

5.80%

4

31-35

10.14%

7

more than 35

21.74%

15

TOTAL

69

65

Q3 Where is the work you produce or edit (or that of journalists you
supervise) primarily published?
Answered: 70

Skipped: 0

In a printed
newspaper

On a website

Regularly both
in a newspap...

Other (please
specify)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES

RESPONSES

In a printed newspaper

47.14%

33

On a website

2.86%

2

Regularly both in a newspaper and on its website

48.57%

34

Other (please specify)

1.43%

1

TOTAL

70

66

Q4 What is your gender?
Answered: 69

Skipped: 1

Female

Male

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

ANSWER CHOICES

RESPONSES

Female

50.72%

35

Male

49.28%

34

TOTAL

69

67

Q5 When I am reporting on a subject or supervising how it is reported, it
is important to me that the reporting contain all the information I would
want as a reader to be able to make my own decisions.
Answered: 65

Skipped: 5

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

93.85%
61

1

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
6.15%
4

2

3

4

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

5

6

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

0.00%
0

0.00%
0

68

7

8

9

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
0.00%
0

10

TOTAL

65

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
3.94

Q6 Making reporting substantially complete, so that it contains all the
information that the journalist would want as a reader, is an ethical
obligation for a journalist.
Answered: 65

Skipped: 5

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

81.54%
53

1

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
16.92%
11

2

3

4

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

5

6

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

1.54%
1

0.00%
0

69

7

8

9

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
0.00%
0

10

TOTAL

65

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
3.80

Q7 At our publication, time and space constraints make it impossible for
us to be concerned about whether our reporting is substantially complete
from a reader’s perspective.
Answered: 65

Skipped: 5

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

1.54%
1

0.2

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
21.54%
14

0.4

0.6

0.8

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

1

1.2

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

24.62%
16

52.31%
34

70

1.4

1.6

1.8

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
0.00%
0

2

TOTAL

65

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
1.72

Q8 When reporting or editing a story, it is important to explain how the
information was obtained, such as identifying sources when possible and
explaining how they were contacted.
Answered: 65

Skipped: 5

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

67.69%
44

1

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
30.77%
20

2

3

4

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

5

6

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

1.54%
1

0.00%
0

71

7

8

9

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
0.00%
0

10

TOTAL

65

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
3.66

Q9 Transparency in how information is gathered, such as identifying
sources when possible and explaining how they were contacted, is an
ethical obligation for a journalist.
Answered: 65

Skipped: 5

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

64.62%
42

1

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
32.31%
21

2

3

4

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

5

6

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

0.00%
0

1.54%
1

72

7

8

9

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
1.54%
1

10

TOTAL

65

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
3.57

Q10 When reporting a story, it is important to reveal information about
who the reporter is, such as organizational or political affiliations that may
affect the reporter’s views of the topic.
Answered: 65

Skipped: 5

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

18.46%
12

1

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
20.00%
13

2

3

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

4

5

6

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

23.08%
15

35.38%
23

73

7

8

9

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
3.08%
2

10

TOTAL

65

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
2.15

Q11 Transparency about who the reporter is, revealing things such as
organizational or political affiliations that may affect the reporter’s views
of the topic, is an ethical obligation for a journalist.
Answered: 64

Skipped: 6

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

21.88%
14

1

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
23.44%
15

2

3

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

4

5

6

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

23.44%
15

28.13%
18

74

7

8

9

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
3.13%
2

10

TOTAL

64

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
2.33

Q12 When a story reveals how the information was obtained, such as
identifying sources when possible and explaining how they were
contacted, this relieves the reporter of any further obligation to tell a
complete story that includes all the information the reporter would want if
he or she were the reader.
Answered: 63

Skipped: 7

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

0.00%
0

0.2

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
3.17%
2

0.4

0.6

0.8

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

1

1.2

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

22.22%
14

73.02%
46

75

1.4

1.6

1.8

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
1.59%
1

2

TOTAL

63

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
1.27

Q13 When a story reveals who the reporter is, such as organizational or
political affiliations that may affect the reporter’s views of the topic, this
relieves the reporter of any further obligation to tell a complete story that
includes all the information the reporter would want if he or she were the
reader.
Answered: 63

Skipped: 7

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

0.00%
0

0.2

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
1.59%
1

0.4

0.6

0.8

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

1

1.2

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

15.87%
10

79.37%
50

76

1.4

1.6

1.8

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
3.17%
2

2

TOTAL

63

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
1.16

Q14 When reporting is complete from the reader’s perspective, including
all the information the journalist would want if he or she were that reader,
this relieves the journalist of any further obligation to reveal how the
information was obtained.
Answered: 63

Skipped: 7

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

1.59%
1

0.2

SOMEWHAT
AGREE
9.52%
6

0.4

0.6

0.8

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

1

1.2

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

31.75%
20

53.97%
34

77

1.4

1.6

1.8

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
3.17%
2

2

TOTAL

63

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
1.52

Q15 When reporting is complete from the reader’s perspective,
including all the information the journalist would want if he or she
were that reader, this relieves the journalist of any further obligation to
reveal information about himself or herself.
Answered: 62
Skipped: 8

(no label)

0

STRONGLY
AGREE
(no
label)

20.97%
13

1

SOMEWHAT
AGREE

2

3

4

SOMEWHAT
DISAGREE

27.42%
17

5

6

STRONGLY
DISAGREE
30.65%
19

78

7

8

9

DON’T KNOW/NO
OPINION
20.97%
13

10

TOTAL

0.00%
0

WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
62

2.48

Appendix G
IRB Approval #4222JM
Jessica McMorris
on behalf of
Institutional Review Board
Hello,
The University of Memphis Institutional Review Board, FWA00006815, has reviewed and approved your
submission in accordance with all applicable statuses and regulations as well as ethical principles.
PI NAME: Alvie Hackle
CO-PI:
PROJECT TITLE: Your journalism is transparent, but is it complete? Examining objectivity’s successors
FACULTY ADVISOR NAME (if applicable): Morgan Arant
IRB ID: #4222
APPROVAL DATE: 10/07/2016
EXPIRATION DATE: 10/07/2017
LEVEL OF REVIEW: Expedited
Please Note: Modifications do not extend the expiration of the original approval
Approval of this project is given with the following obligations:
1. If this IRB approval has an expiration date, an approved renewal must be in effect to continue the
project prior to that date. If approval is not obtained, the human consent form(s) and recruiting
material(s) are no longer valid and any research activities involving human subjects must stop.
2. When the project is finished or terminated, a completion form must be completed and sent to the
board.
3. No change may be made in the approved protocol without prior board approval, whether the approved
protocol was reviewed at the Exempt, Expedited or Full Board level.
4. Exempt approval are considered to have no expiration date and no further review is necessary unless
the protocol needs modification.

Thank you,
James P. Whelan, Ph.D.
Institutional Review Board Chair
The University of Memphis.
Note: Review outcomes will be communicated to the email address on file. This email should be considered
an official communication from the UM IRB.
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2. When the project is finished or terminated, a completion form must be submitted.
3. No change may be made in the approved protocol without prior board approval.
*Modifications do not extend the expiration of the original approval

Thank you,
James P. Whelan, Ph.D.
Institutional Review Board Chair
The University of Memphis.
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Approval of this project is given with the following obligations:
1. If this IRB approval has an expiration date, an approved renewal must be in effect to continue the
project prior to that date. If approval is not obtained, the human consent form(s) and recruiting
material(s) are no longer valid and any research activities involving human subjects must stop.
2. When the project is finished or terminated, a completion form must be completed and sent to the
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protocol was reviewed at the Exempt, Expedited or Full Board level.
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